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Negligence Per Se and the Virginia
Motor Vehicle Code
WILLIAM

T. MusE

Wigmore, writing in 1911, said: "The general question...
whether an injury caused by the defendant while violating a
[criminal] statute is actionable per se is a troublesome one,
open to much argument, and not yet settled by any generally
accepted principle." Comment, 6 Ill. L. Rev. 350 (1911). Giving
due recognition to the scholarly labors spent on this problem
by writers, judges, and practitioners over the intervening
almost half-century, Wigmore's observation is equally true
today. In working out the proper relation between criminal
statutes and tort liability the courts have generally adopted
one of the following three views:
1. Violation of the criminal statute is negligence per se; the
standard of conduct set by the statute is conclusive evidence
of the standard to be applied in tort cases.
2. Violation of the criminal statute is irrelevant to tort
liability; the standard of conduct set by the criminal statute
is no evidence of the standard to be applied in tort cases. This
is the extreme opposite of the negligence per se view.
3. Violation of the criminal statute is evidence of negligence; the standard set by the criminal statute is evidence of
the standard to be applied in tort cases. This is a compromise
between the other two views.
In Virginia all three views are followed. Cases involving
the nature of the standards established by the Motor Vehicle
Code in the regulation of traffic are in a state of irreconcilable
confusion. Each provision of the seven chapters of the Motor
Vehicle Code is explicitly a criminal statute. Va. Code Ann. §§
46-18, 46-180, 46-385, 46-396, 46-509 (1950). These statutes
contain no legislative indication that they are to have any civil
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consequences whatever. It may be suggested that the confusion
found in the Virginia cases is due, in part, to (1) the court's
traditional technique in considering legal cause (i.e., "proximate cause") as a part of the concept of negligence; (2) a
finding, either expressly or impliedly, of negligence by the
common law standard of "a reasonable man under the circumstances" independently of, or in addition to, the violation
of the statutory standard; or (3) having submitted the whole
question of defendant's liability to the jury under such circumstances as to make it impossible to determine whether the
jury did accept, or was expected to accept, the statutory
standard as conclusive.
The following cases seem to hold that standards of conduct
required by the Motor Vehicle Code are final and conclusive,
and conduct falling short of that specified in the statutes
constitutes negligence per se, i.e., negligence as a matter of
law: Cohen v. Meador, 119 Va. 429 (1925) Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. Blount, 158 Va. 421 (1932); Lucas v. Craft, 161
Va. 228 (1933) ; Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va. 601 (1934) ; Roanoke
Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Whitner, 173 Va. 253 (1939); Hubbard v.
Murray, 173 Va. 448, 452 (1939), dictum; Temple v. Moses, 175
Va. 320 (1940) ; Huffnan v. Jackson, 175 Va. 564 (1940) ; Smith
v. Turner, 178 Va. 172 (1941); Isenhour v. McGranighan,178
Va. 365 (1941) ; Noland v. Fowler, 179 Va. 19 (1942) ; Sanders
v. Newsom, 179 Va. 582 (1942); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
Clark, 179 Va. 596 (1942); Luck v. Rice, 182 Va. 373 (1944);
HarrisMotor Lines v. Green, 184 Va. 984 (1946); Schools v.
Walker, 187 Va. 619 (1948); Crouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156
(1948); Savage Truck Line v. Traylor, 193 Va. 579 (1952);
Manhattan for Hire Car Corp. v. O'Connell, 194 Va. 398
(1952); Virginia Transit Co. v. Tidd, 194 Va. 418 (1952);
Birtcherd Dairy, Inc. v. Edwards, 197 Va. 830 (1956).
On the other hand, the following cases very definitely hold
that the statutory standards of the Motor Vehicle Code are
not conclusive, and conduct falling short of that specified in
the statutes does not constitute negligence pe, se: Morris v.
Dane, 161 Va. 545 (1933) ; Howe v. Jones, 162 Va. 442 (1934).;
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Wright v. Viar, 162 Va. 510 (1934) ; Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va.
654 (1934); Gale v. Wilber, 163 Va. 211 (1934); VirginiaElec.
& Power Co. v. Holland, 184 Va. 893 (1946); Clark v. Hodges,
185 Va. 431 (1946) ; Smiithv. Clark, 187 Va. 181 (1948) ; Doss v.
Rader, 187 Va. 231 (1948) ; Hamilton v. Glemming, 187 Va. 309
(1948); Powell v. Virginian Ry. Co., 187 Va. 384 (1948); Hinton v. Gallagher, 190 Va. 421 (1950); Asphalt Service Co. v.
Thomas, 198 Va. 490 (1956) ; Lavenstein v. Maile, 146 Va. 789,
799 (1926), where the court said: "We do not wish to be understood as saying that there could be no case in which an automobile driver would not be guilty of negligence in driving to
the left of the road when meeting another car, even in violation
of the law of the road."
In the majority of cases involving this problem the opinions
are too indefinite to permit their classification either as for
or against the rule that the violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code is negligence per se. They disclose an obvious unwillingness to accept the criminal law standards established by the
Motor Vehicle Code as final and conclusive in all cases. This is
demonstrated by a rather frequent resort to a strained application of a so-called rule of "proximate cause" to relieve the
defendant of liability for having violated a statute. Thus, in
Clay v. Bishop, 182 Va. 746, 751 (1944), the plaintiff was walking on the right side of the highway leading a horse when he
was struck by a truck proceeding in the same direction on its
right side of the road. In considering the plaintiff's negligence
the court said: "Even if it be assumed that the statute does
apply, and that its violation was negligence per se, yet it was
for the jury to say whether such violation was a remote cause
and the negligence of the driver was the proximate cause of
the accident." Also, in Dinges v. Hannah, 185 Va. 744, 747
(1946), the defendant exceeded the emergency war-time speed
limit of thirty-five miles an hour. The court held that the
"evidence fails to show that [defendant] was guilty of... any
negligence, which proximately caused the collision." Again,
in White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 672 (1947),
the operator of an automobile was driving after his permit
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had expired when he ran over a small boy, aged 6, and killed
him. In holding for the defendant, the court said:
Under familiar principles, [plaintiff] argues, the
breaches of these statutes [including one requiring a
driver's permit] were negligence per se.
[The plaintiff] then concludes that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the boy's death. The trouble
with this reasoning is that there is an entire lack of
evidence of any causal connection between the statutory
violations and the child's injury and death.
Likewise, in Grouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156, 167 (1948), the
plaintiff was struck from behind and injured by defendant's
car while he walked on the right side of the road in violation
of the statute. The court said that the plaintiff's violation of
the statute "amounts to negligence as a matter of law.
Whether or not such a violation be a remote cause or the
cause which proximately contributes to the injury is a question
for the jury." It is obvious that in none of these four cases
was there any problem of "proximate cause." While the
final outcome of three of the four cases could be justified on
other and more orthodox grounds, they illustrate that the
court is employing "proximate cause" language to hold, in
reality, that the violations were not negligence per se.
Another escape from the rigidity of the negligence per se
rule has been, on occasion, a somewhat ingenious interpretation of the statute. For example, in Morris v. Dame, 161 Va.
545, 567 (1933), the court held: "Under a reasonable construction of a statutory provision such as [the criminal statute
requiring a signal of a turn at a highway intersection], when
no practical or reasonable degree of care and diligence for the
safety of another would call for the performance of an act
required thereby, no duty to do the act arises to [the plaintiff]
as an individual." On the other hand, in Schools v. Walker, 187
Va. 619 (1948), it seems that the court unnecessarily interpreted several rules of the road to be intended for the protection of the plaintiff's house located 85 feet from the point on
the highway where the violations took place. See also Gough v.
Shaner, 197 Va. 572 (1955), where the court based liability on
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a criminal ordinance which obviously had not been breached.
A study of all the cases involving the Motor Vehicle Code
reveals that the court is conscious of common law fault or lack
of fault apart from, or in addition to, violation of the statute.
It is submitted that in each case holding the defendant liable
for having violated the statute there was ample evidence of
common law negligence. On the other hand, where it is apparent that there was no common law negligence, the court has
found a way to neutralize the statute. This being true, why
use the criminal statutes in tort cases at all?
In many cases the court has not imposed an absolute duty
to comply with the statute. On the contrary, it has imposed
only the duty to use reasonable care to meet the statutory
standard. Thus, in these cases, the court is not holding the
violation of the statute to be negligence per se. For example,
see Wright v. Viar, 162 Va. 510, 514 (1934), where the court,
in referring to the duties imposed by the Motor Vehicle Code,
said: "In the performance of these duties he must exercise
ordinary care." Again, in Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Holland, 184 Va. 893, 901 (1946), the court, in considering whether
the traffic statute had been violated, said: "There would appear to be no other rule to guide the operator of an automobile
under the conditions than the one of ordinary care." Schools
v. Walker, 187 Va. 619, 624 (1948), holds that "reasonable care
under the circumstances" is all that is required. To the same
effect, see Smith v.Clark, 187 Va. 181 (1948). But see Birtcherd
Dairy v. Edwards, 197 Va. 830, 834 (1956), which is expressly
contra.
Most of the Virginia cases have not discussed the validity of
the negligence per se doctrine. They rather assume its verity.
The only two cases that give this problem more than passing
consideration are Morris v. Dame, 161 Va. 545 (1933), and
Howe v. Jones, 162 Va. 442 (1934). In the latter case, at page
447, the court, in upholding the refusal of the trial court to
instruct the jury that breach of the motor vehicle statutes
amounted to negligence, said:
This is a well-established rule and finds ample support
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in many of our decisions... But like all general rules
it is incapable of universal and literal application. In
the instant case undoubtedly the defendant was on the
wrong side of the road and the accident would not have
occurred had he not been there. The violation of statutes,
however, may be due to supervenient causes ... Something more than the violation of the letter of the statute
is at times necessary.
See also Russell v. Kelly, 180 Va. 304 (1942), and Birtoherds
Dairy v. Randall, 180 Va. 311 (1942).
While the negligence per se doctrine is stated, and taken for
granted, in most cases, in other cases the court has not failed
to recognize the unsuitability of criminal statutes in tort cases.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the "reckless driving"
statute has no applicability in tort cases: Morris v. Dame, 161
Va. 545 (1933); Gale v. Wilber, 163 Va. 211 (1934). Yet, in
Via v. Badanes, 189 Va. 44 (1949), the violation of the same
statute was held to be negligence per se. Another view was
taken in Noland v. Fowler, 179 Va. 19 (1942), where the court
thought that the violation of the "reckless driving" statute
was negligence per se as applied to a driver who was familiar
with the danger ahead but not as applied to a driver who was
unfamiliar with the road. Finally, in Davis v. Webb, 189 Va.
80 (1949), the whole matter was left to the jury to decide.
Why should not these tort cases be tried without any reference to criminal statutes ? It is submitted that they should be,
and some of the reasons for this view are briefly set forth, but
not developed, below:
1. In framing the statute the legislature not only did not
intend to set a standard for civil conduct but was endeavoring
to formulate a standard for a wholly different purpose, viz., to
govern criminal conduct.
2. The immediate purpose of criminal law is to punish the
offender, whereas the primary purpose of tort law is to compensate a deserving plaintiff. It may be doubted that a rule
formulated for the one purpose is always well suited for the
other purpose.
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3. The negligence per se theory, in effect, requires the
offender to be convicted of a crime before he can be held to be
negligent. Furthermore, he is tried for the violation of a
criminal statute by a civil court under whose procedural rules
he may be found guilty of the violation on less evidence than is
necessary in a criminal trial. The Virginia court has frequently
referred to the finding of violation in the civil case as a "conviction." Clark v. Hodges, 185 Va. 431, 436 (1946) ; Murray v.
Smithson, 187 Va. 759, 763 (1948).
4. Courts should not be encouraged to search for readymade standards, but should be encouraged to create and construct their own standards. If this is done the judges will
spend more thought in this task than if there are available
ready-made standards of potential suitability. Since he has
spent more thought in its creation, it naturally follows that
the judge should have a better understanding of the standard.
It has been suggested that the doctrine of negligence per se
grew up because of the judiciary's respect for legislation. A
more realistic reason, perhaps, is the failure of some judges to
think out problems for themselves, or a lack of appreciation
by many judges of the progress of tort law since the time of
undifferentiation of criminal and tort liability in primitive law.
5. A conscious devotion to the negligence per se rule leads
the court to prostitute the rightful office of "proximate cause"
in too many cases in order to reach a final result which it
considers just. The concept of cause being, perhaps, the most
difficult to understand and apply in tort cases, it seems unfortunate that so many of the negligence per se cases are forced
into the use of this concept when a refusal to employ the
statute would leave the case to turn on the relatively simple
question of common law negligence.
6. Frequently the criminal statute, as written, requires
amendment by the court to make it suitable for use in the tort
case. The amendment may be an addition to the statute, as in
the cases holding that reasonable care to comply is sufficient,
or it may result in throwing out a part of the statute, as in the
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cases where "reckless driving" is held not applicable in tort
cases.
Assuming it to be desirable, may a Virginia court refuse to
employ the criminal statutes of the Motor Vehicle Code in the
trial of tort cases ? It has been done. It is submitted that it may
properly be done, and should be done, if it is possible under
Virginia law. There is no compelling common law rule against
it; however, consideration has to be given to two infrequently
used Virginia statutes which seem to compel the use of the
negligence per se doctrine. Neitaer of the statutes is a part of
the Motor Vehicle Code.
Va. Code Ann. §8-646.3 (1950) is entitled "Civil liability for
damages resulting from criminal violations" and provides as
follows:
In addition to the punishment prescribed for violation
of any section of chapters 1 to 4 of Title 46, any person
violating any of such provisions shall be liable for such
damages as any other person may suffer as a result of
such violations.
The chapters referred to are the first four chapters of the
Motor Vehicle Code, including the Rules of the Road. The
negligence per se doctrine was created and has developed to
its present state in Virginia entirely independent of section
8-646.3. The statute was never cited until the recent case of
Kidd v. Little, 194 Va. 692, 695 (1953), and it has not been
cited since then. In spite of this statute having been originally,
and until 1950, a part of the impounding statute, the conclusion
that it has codified the negligence per se rule seems inescapable. Apparently the existence of this statute is generally
known neither to the judiciary nor to the bar of Virginia.
There is one rather strange inconsistency involving chapter 3
of the Motor Vehicle Code. By section 8-646.3, the violation
of any of the statutes in this chapter by a defendant is negligence per se, yet section 46-67 provides that such violation by
a plaintiff shall not be negligence. Furthermore, there may be
some question as to the applicability of section 8-646.3 to the
nln;"f;#
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The other pertinent statute is a general one of much older
vintage. Section 8-652 is entitled "Damages from violation of
a statute, remedy therefor and the penalty," and provides as
follows:
Any person injured by the violation of any statute may
recover from the offender such damages as he may sustain by reason of the violation, even though a penalty or
forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed, unless
such penalty or forfeiture be expressly mentioned to be in
lieu of such damages....
It would seem rather clear that this statute was intended to
create civil liability for injury or damage resulting from conduct in violation of any criminal statute, including the Motor
Vehicle Code. A similar Kentucky statute (KRS 446:070) has
been consistently so construed. It is submitted that the Virginia statute should be similarly construed. Indeed, it has been
given this meaning by the Virginia court: Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 179 (1883) ; Richmond & Danville
R. R. Co. v. Noell, 86 Va. 19, 23 (1889) (held for defendant; no
proximate cause) ; Miller Mfg. Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255, 259
(1919) ; StandardRed CedarChest Co. v. Monroe, 125 Va. 442,
444 (1919) ; Wyatt v. C. and P. Tel. Co., 158 Va. 470, 477 (1932)
(held for defendant; no proximate cause); Oliver v. Cashin,
192 Va. 540, 547 (1951), semble. Indeed, there is no case holding to the contrary.
Section 8-652 has fallen into almost complete disuse due,
perhaps, to an unfortunate dictum made in an early federal
case. In Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 634, 637
(4th Cir. 1893), the court said:
It is very evident that the purpose of section [8-652]
was merely to preserve to an injured person the right to
maintain his action for the injury he may have received
by reason of the wrongdoing of another, and to prevent
the wrongdoer from setting up the defense that he had
paid the penalty of his wrongdoing under a penal statute.
It cannot be supposed that in enacting section [8-652] the
legislature had the remotest idea of creating any new
ground for brinzina an action for damages."
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Although the language is not precise, its meaning is clear when
the facts, with reference to which this statement was made,
are kept in mind. The plaintiff was seeking to recover for
mental suffering unaccompanied by any physical injury. The
law does not protect this interest against negligent conduct,
i.e., this is not one of the rights of the plaintiff protected by
law. It is obvious that the court meant that the statute did
not create any new rights in the plaintiff. This is entirely
consistent with the Virginia cases cited above, all of which
involved well-recognized rights of the plaintiff to which the
law had given protection from time immemorial. Two state
cases involved similar situations and therefore properly repeated the language of the federal case: Connelly v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51 (1902) (mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury) and Hortenstein v. Virginia-Carolina Ry. Co., 102 Va. 914 (1904) (action for death resulting
from violation of Sunday statute; safety of others not within
purpose of statute).
To summarize the Virginia law, it may be said that the cases
are conflicting as to whether the violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code is negligence per se, but it would seem that sections
8-646.3 and 8-652 compel the holding that the violation of a
criminal statiute, including the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Code, is conclusive of negligence. If so, do these statutes apply
to the plaintiff's conduct as well?

